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16 May 1961

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CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN



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State Dept. review completed

TOP SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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16 May 1961

DAILY BRIEF

*South Korea: (Information available as of 0500 EDT)
The only military units thus far identified with the military coup staged in Seoul in the early morning hours of 16 May are elements of the South Korean Second Army and some marine units. The rest of the army, the air force, and most navy elements reportedly have not thus far participated in the revolutionary activity; which way they will throw their support is not clear. Although the "military revolutionary committee" set up shortly after the coup claims that it controls the entire country, and evidently does control the city of Seoul, and possibly Taegu, it is still questionable whether

The "military revolutionary committee," which claims to be anti-Communist, pro-US, and pro-UN, has been issuing proclamations over the name of Army Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Chang To-yong. Early on 16 May Chang asked the commander of UN forces in Korea, US General Magruder, for the assistance of American forces in putting down the revolt, and the revolt leaders may be merely using his name. Chang has, however, since been in contact with the coup leaders, and his present position is not known; it is possible he is working for a compromise which would avoid further armed conflict. In any event, the real leader and chief planner of the coup appears to be Maj. Gen. Pak Chong-hui, deputy commander of the Second Army,

The whereabouts of Prime Minister Chang Myon is not known; but he apparently escaped when the coup leaders tried to capture him and is now in hiding. According to press reports, a number of other government officials are under house arrest in Seoul.

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	governmental relat	ions between the two countribloc economic and military	es are rela- \
	continues.	•	25X1
	adverse treatment	week the Communist bloc has by the UAR press and radio,	as received some
25X1	decrease in UAR cr Backup, F	iticism of the United States. Page 6)	25X1
		h has told the American amb undertaken by Prime Ministe	
	necessary and that	he will support them. Neve power in Iran has traditiona	rtheless, he
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25X1	centrate power and hands. Apparently cial visits to major he can rule without tions, however, are King's personal rule ment of a new cabin loyal to him. The K and some evidence applice and military	Hassan II is continuing mane government administration intenthusiastic crowds during his cities seem to have convinced political parties. Most major becoming bolder in their attact. They will probably resent et—which is said to be imminuassan chooses only nonpolitical suggests he is planning to initical controls in the major cities of Page 9) West German and West Berl	to his own s recent offi- d Hassan that r political fac- acks on the the appoint- entif,
	ers are reported co -the upper house o lin, possibly on 16 3 which commemorate Khrushchev told the the bloc would be wi peace treaty provide presumably such as doubtful, however, alter the timing of S sity of likely Soviet	nsidering holding a meeting of the West German parliamen June, the eve of the "Day of Ges the East Berlin uprisings of West German ambassador on Illing to postpone the conclusied the West made no "unexpecta parliamentary meeting in It that a Bundesrat meeting wou soviet moves regarding Berlin protests would depend to some meeting between Khrushchev (Page 10)	f the Bundesrat tin West Ber- german Unity'' of 17 June 1953. In 24 April that on of a separate eted moves,'' Berlin. It is Ild materially In. The inten- ine extent on
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*USSR-Nuclear Test Ban Conference: The formal Soviet statement at Geneva on 15 May warning that further French nuclear testing will make a test ban agreement "impossible" and "may compel" the USSR to resume testing, appears designed to divert attention from control issues. The long delay in reacting to the French test of 25 April suggests that the Soviet leaders hope to inflate the question of French testing into a major point in the discussions between President Kennedy and De Gaulle. By repeating previous charges that the French have tested in order to perfect weapons for the benefit of NATO and thereby gain "unilateral advantages" for the West, Moscow apparently hopes to minimize recent Western concessions and create the impression that the West has not negotiated seriously.

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DAILY BRIEF

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South Korea

Major General Pak Chong-hui was court-martialed in 1948 on charges of being a Communist and was sentenced to 10 years in prison. At the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, he was recalled to service, and subsequently was pardoned because of his war record. He is not known to have re-established contacts with the Communists or to have been connected with South Korean leftist groups since 1948. However, because of alleged efforts to stir up discontent among officer elements following the revolt which toppled Rhee in April 1960, there was some question of his loyalty and whether he would soon be dropped from the Army.

The South Korean Second Army is largely composed of training and logistical units. It is not known whether units of the First Army--South Korea's combat ready force deployed along the Demilitarized Zone facing North Korea-support the uprising. First Army support for the coup could ensure its success. Although a proclamation of the "revolutionary committee" has named the First Army commanding general Yi Han-lim as "martial law commander" in the front line areas,

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In a six point proclamation the insurgents, who have proclaimed martial law, have announced that they intend to strengthen anti-Communist measures, observe the UN charter, wipe out government corruption, rehabilitate the economy, work for Korean unification, and eventially return the government to civilian authority when their mission is accomplished. However, Pak and his supporters had no definite plans for administering the government after they seized power. There also were indications that the Pak group was discontented over the loss of the privileged position enjoyed by the military under the Rhee regime. In the year since Rhee's ouster, many senior officers have been cashiered from the service, a civilian committee has been set up to investigate military affairs, and the press has been permitted to criticise the armed forces.

Army Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Chang To-yong was one of those widely criticized in the press for his support of the Rhee regime and accused of acquiring an illegal fortune through

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graft and corruption. Chang knew that Pak was planning a coup, but claimed last month that he lacked sufficient evidence to arrest the plotters. It is possible that Chang now may be playing both sides of the fence in an effort to assure his position whatever the outcome.

The North Korean regime has not yet commented on to-day's events in South Korea. The only Communist bloc reaction noted thus far has been a Moscow TASS item, and this essentially was a repeat of American press reports.

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Khrushchev Criticizes UAR Policies		
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Relations between the Soviet and UAR governments, however, have been relatively good in recent months. Work on the Aswan Dam, for which Moscow has already extended credits totaling \$325,000,000, appears to be progressing satisfactorily. Soviet technicians are also working on a number of projects in the Egyptian region under a \$175,000,-000 credit granted in 1958. In early 1961 the USSR resumed large-scale deliveries of arms, including MIG-19 jet fighters.

Moscow has voiced approval when the UAR has taken a stand in opposition to the West or in support of some Soviet position. However, Soviet leaders have been irritated by such actions as Cairo's refusal to endorse Khrushchev's proposal for replacing the UN secretary general with a three-man secretariat and to give fuller support to the USSR at the UN during the Congo crisis.

The Nasir regime's attitude toward Arab Communists has been a consistent source of irritation to the USSR. Khrushchev's public criticism of arrests of Egyptian and Syrian Communists in late 1958 and early 1959 caused a deterioration of Soviet-UAR relations. Since then some features of Nasir's policies, including the continued suppression of Communists and the relatively slow pace of agrarian reform in the UAR, have been criticized from time to time, usually through international Communist journals and the Communist

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press in Lebanon. The current issue of the World Marxist Review, published in Prague, carries a strong attack by an anonymous author on the treatment of Communists in the UAR.

Nasir is sensitive to such criticisms and to the unfavorable comments made by Khalid Bakdash-head of the Syrian Communist party who is in exile in the bloc-about the growing domination of Syria by Egyptians since the merger in 1958.

The US Embassy in Cairo believes that the recent shift in UAR propaganda is also related to the deterioration of its foreign exchange balance and to the Nasir regime's desire to appear somewhat more friendly in anticipation of forthcoming negotiations for additional US assistance in the form of surplus agricultural products.

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Developments in Iran		
felt charges of corruption highly exaggerated but the public to be corrupt were arrested would be tried, ished. If they are found	nerican ambassador on 13 May that I n among government officials were at arrests of those believed by the e necessary to calm the situation. T and if found guilty they would be pur not guilty, the people's anger would ester of justice, and not against the	hose n-
tively popular, chiefly be for some time. He adde as Amini failed to meet t ing him. The monarch r	Prime Minister Amini now is relacted that this popularity would diminish the demands of the people now suppopularitained that the recent crisis coule had not had the power to dissolve new government.	n ort-
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Ministry of Justice office stated that more than 10 tried for election irregulation council members partici 154 constituencies. Cas	also announced the dismissal of tentials, and the public prosecutor has 0 electoral council members will be larities. Several thousand electoral pate in overseeing the elections in less of illegal interference with electorably be made against most of the	l
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Bonn Reported Planning Bundesrat Meeting in West Berlin

The East German news agency declared on 11 May that a Bundesrat meeting in West Berlin would be "provocative," reiterating the contention that "West German attempts to treat West Berlin as part of the Federal Republic grossly violate the existing unequivocal legal position and constitute a provocation" against the regime. Earlier, the East Germans charged that Mayor Brandt was attempting to foment a revolt in East Germany and they probably would claim that scheduling such a meeting on 16 June would be intended to spark a revolution.

Since July 1959, when Khrushchev attacked the meeting in Berlin of the West German national convention which elected West German President Luebke, the USSR has been attempting to make an international issue of the question of holding meetings of West German parliamentary bodies there. Annual meetings of either or both the Bundesrat and Bundestag had been held in West Berlin from 1950 to 1959 in order to foster the idea that the city is still Germany's national capital and to stress West Berlin's ties with the Federal Republic. These meetings have been increasingly under attack by the Communists, and last July Khrushchev threatened to "consider" signing a separate peace treaty with East Germany if Bonn held its annual Bundestag session in Berlin.

Following consultation with British, French, and American representatives, Chancellor Adenauer last fall decided against a Bundestag meeting in order to avoid doing anything which might aggravate tensions in the city. Berlin officials, however, have frequently expressed regret over the failure of the Bundestag to meet in Berlin last year and stress the view that it would be dangerous to let such an important link between Bonn and Berlin as legislative sessions in Berlin be discontinued.

Mayor Brandt is reported to have raised the issue of a meeting of only the upper house in Berlin with Franz Meyers, president of the Bundesrat, during the latter's appearance in Berlin on May Day. Meyers, who is now visiting the United States and scheduled to visit in Washington from 21 to 24 May,

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is legally empowered to convene the Bundesrat where chooses, but he is not likely to do so if Adenauer strobjects.	

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